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Introduction
The concise set of treaties called De substantia orbis is a very modest work 
with quite serious pretensions. As Averroes says, he intended to take up 
problems moved by Aristotle in the works that perished and did not come 
#0#
* Łukasz Tomanek—PhD student at Faculty of Humanities at the University of Silesia 
in Katowice. He studied philosophy and classics at the University of Silesia in Katowice, 
and manuscript studies at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto. His 
research clusters around Latin reception of Averroes in 13th and 14th century philoso-
phy of nature with special regard to commentaries on the De substantia orbis of Averroes.
Address for correspondence: University of Silesia in Katowice, Department of Philos-
ophy, Bankowa 11, 40-007 Katowice. E-mail: lukasz.tomanek@o365.us.edu.pl.
** This paper is a result of research financed from the grant of the Polish National 
Science Center (NCN) nr 2017/27/N/HS1/02528.
182 Łukasz tomanek
to our times.1 As such, this work encompasses a summary of the whole 
interpretation of the Aristotelian corpus made by the Cordovan philosopher 
and can be therefore viewed as the abstract of the most important issues 
in the philosophy of nature, cosmology in particular. Among Latin school-
men, De substantia orbis established itself along with Michael Scot’s 
translation in the 2nd half of the 13th century.2 By the end of 13th and the 
beginning of the 14th century, though, De substantia orbis had already been 
perceived as a supplement, annexus to Aristotle’s De caelo, and as a text com-
plementary to Metaphysics, Physics, De generatione and Meteorology, and 
by the end of the 13th century it became the material for academic lectures 
and philosophical exegesis.3 The commentaries on the De substantia orbis 
1 Averroes, De substantia orbis I (ed. Iuntina IX, f. 5vbK–L): “Declaratum est igitur 
ex hoc sermone quae est substantia caeli et hoc quod hic fuit dictum, enim quiddam eius 
invenitur probatum ab Aristotele in suis libris et quiddam sequitur ex suis dictis. Sed 
apparet ex verbis Aristotelis quod declaravit omnia ista in libris qui non pervenerunt ad 
nos. Vocetur ergo iste tractatus Sermo de substantia orbis. Dignior est enim hoc nomine 
quod intitulavit hoc titulo.” The Giuntina edition of the De substantia orbis, to which 
I am referring here, is highly imperfect, so it made me use three additional manuscripts 
to compare them with the renaissance edition: Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 6296; 
lat. 6506; lat. 15453. On printed edition of the De substantia orbis critically compared 
with its manuscript transmission, see Licata, 2019. 
2 On Latin version of the treatise compared to its Hebrew version, see Hyman, 1986 
and esp. Licata, 2019; for an up-to-date list of known manuscripts containing Michael 
Scot’s translation of the De substantia orbis, see Digital Averroes Research Environment 
(https://dare.uni-koeln.de/app/, last access: 5.01.2021).
3 Cf. Fernandus Hispanus, Commentum in De substantia orbis, prooemium (Vatican, 
Biblioteca Apostolica, Vat. lat. 845, f. 272va): “Et licet Philosophus de istis entibus nobil-
ibus, videlicet corporibus caelestibus et eorum motoribus, principalius in dicto libro Caeli 
et mundi inquirat quam in alio loco naturalis philosophiae ob difficultatem, tamen eorum 
in pluribus aliis locis sua librorum multa de ipsis interserit, ut patet 8 Physicorum, De gen-
eratione, 1 Metheororum et in pluribus locis suae Metaphysicae, praecipue in 12. Et ideo 
sententia Aristotelis de natura caelestium corporum et eorum motoribus obscura necnon 
in quibusdam dubia esse videtur. Propter quod Averroes, commentator Aristotelis et eius 
philosophiae singularis emulator, quemdam libellum edidit quem De substantia orbis 
intitulavit in quo Aristotelis sententiam de natura caelestium corporum et eorum motorum 
necnon differentiam et convenientiam eorum ad generabilia et corruptibilia in substantia 
et in actionibus, tam ex parte corporum quam ex parte formarum breviter et optime expli-
cavit, quaedam expressa ab Aristotele in diversis locis assumens, quaedam ex verborum 
eius intentione sillogizans.” Here and in the following pages I am referring to manuscript 
Vat. lat. 845, which, according to my research, is the most reliable and consistent witness 
in the manuscript tradition of Fernand’s commentary. The cited text has been critically 
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cover what appear to be significant problems concerning the structure of tran-
sient beings compared with the structure of celestial bodies. The frag-
ments of this opusculum, rendering the nature of the prime mover and the 
heavens, are especially significant in this regard.4 They refer to the subject 
matter that became the impulse towards setting the competition of natural 
reason and philosophy with faith and theology in investigating God and its 
attributes. In the kernel of this subject lies the question of how our natural 
faculties can acquire knowledge of God’s power and divine causality by 
referring solely to the observation of local movement and non-experimental 
study of the substance of celestial spheres. 
To illustrate the tension between natural cognition and conclu-
sions of faith, I chose three commentaries on the De substantia orbis, 
two of which were written in Paris, one by Fernand of Spain in the last two 
decades of the 13th century and the other by Maino de’ Maineri composed 
around 1315.5 The third commentary was anonymously composed in Erfurt 
established by the author. For some of other manuscripts containing this commentary, 
see Weijers, 2003, p. 94; Iohannes de Ianduno, Quaestiones in Physicam, prologus 
(ed. Venetia, 1544, sine folio): “Considerandum est quod libris praenotatis in quibus 
traduntur partes scientiae naturalis annexi sunt quidam alii libelli Aristotelis et Averrois 
[...] liber autem Averrois De substantia orbis annexus est quodammodo libro Caeli et 
mundi quantum ad 1 et 2 <librum> et aliqualiter 8 Physicorum.”; Magninus de Mai-
neriis, Quaestiones in De substantia orbis, principium (ed. Fioravanti, 2016, p. 223): 
“[I] tendo de corpore caelesti solum et de his quae ad eum (!) pertinent, de quo quamvis 
Aristoteles declaravit in primis duobus libris Caeli et mundi et in multis aliorum suorum 
librorum fecit mentionem, sicut in 2 De generatione et 8 Physicorum et 8 Metaphysicae 
et 12, tamen nihilominus Averroes commentator egregius verborum Aristotelis voluit 
nobis tractatum de hoc facere, aggregans quae ab Aristotele dicta sunt diffuse in aliis, 
quaedam tamen eliciens ex verbis Aristotelis de ipso caelo quae Aristoteles non expres-
sit. Et hunc librum volo ad praesens repetere ad meam informationem.” I classicized 
and unified the Latin in the last fragment. The popularity of the De substantia orbis is 
also attested by its critical reception in works of Giles of Rome and Hervaeus Natalis: 
Aegidius Romanus, De materia caeli contra Averroistas (ed. Venetia, 1500, ff. 85r–90v); 
Hervaeus Natalis, De materia caeli (ed. Venetia, 1513, ff. 33rb–53va).
4 See fragments discussed below on pp. 188–190.
5 Both authors are often mentioned in the context of Latin Averroism and its develop-
ment after condemnation in 1277 in late 13th and early 14th century Paris. For literature 
concerning Fernand of Spain, see n. 23. For literature concerning Maino de’ Maineri, 
see n. 39. From the extensive literature dealing with the historical context of Parisian 
condemnations in 1270 and 1277 with their meaning, the following positions need to be 
listed: Bianchi, 1990; Bianchi, 1999; Bianchi, 2009; Libera, 1991, pp. 193–220; Putallaz, 
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in the second half of the 14th century. I chose these commentaries due to the 
doctrinally different ways in which they tackle Averroes’s treatise. For the 
sake of this article, I will label these two kinds of inquiry (1) an exegetical 
approach and (2) a critical approach on Averroes. The first two commentaries 
are examples of the former—they comment upon the De substantia orbis, 
adopting and consistently developing Averroes’s solutions. In the third of the 
commentaries, although its author comments upon the De substantia orbis 
as an authoritative work, he does not follow Averroes’s lead in choosing 
the answers but instead tends to perceive his work merely as a pretext for 
taking up philosophically important questions, disagreeing though with the 
solutions achieved by the Commentator.6
1995; Thijssen, 1998, pp. 40–56. For a general presentation of the intellectual climate 
and importance of Averroes at the Faculty of Arts in Paris at the beginning of the 14th 
century, see: Imbach, 1989, pp. 102–130; Riedlinger, 1967, pp. 12–67.
6 In this paper, I deliberately refrain from labeling these two approaches as Averrois-
tic or non-Averroistic, even though the first two commentaries are commonly known 
as representing Latin Averroism and heterodox ideas. I do not intend to measure the 
“degree” of Averroism in these authors, but—for purposes of this article—I prefer to 
see in their works the exegesis of authoritative work that the De substantia orbis was 
at the Faculty of Arts in Paris and later at the studium generale in Erfurt. The prob-
lem of Averroism in the case of these exegetes has already partially been covered by 
scholars (see below n. 21 and n. 38), yet the relationship between the author’s Averro-
ism and the fact of commenting directly on Averroes has not been studied yet. As will 
be seen below, commenting on Averroes—just like it was in the case of commenting 
on Aristotle or other authoritative works—did not always presuppose Averroistic 
inclinations or the clearly exegetic intentions of the author. Also, commenting upon 
the De substantia orbis, even with an explanatory scope, did not always mean uncritical 
sympathy for the Commentator. The example of a philosopher doctrinally far from being 
Averroist, yet at times following Averroes quite closely is Henry Totting de Oyta. In his 
early questions, written in Erfurt, on the De substantia orbis (Erfurt, Biblioteca Amp-
loniana 2° 297, ff. 149ra–158rb), he is an exegete just as he is an exegete in his later 
paraphrases and detailed expositions of Aristotelian corpus. However, his commentary 
lacks questions on God’s infinite power or divine causality—usually discussed even by 
authors critical to Averroes, like in the case of the anonymous Erfurt author presented 
below—which might mark Henry’s unwillingness to discuss such controversial issues in 
the context of the De substantia orbis without discarding other valuable aspects of this 
treatise at the same time. Some clues as to the status of Averroes’ work and the teaching 
practice might be found in John Aurifaber of Halberstadt, who taught in Erfurt and 
Halberstadt. In his long and complex Sophisma de dimensionibus (Leipzig, Universi-
tatsbibliothek 1444, ff. 149va–152va), Aurifaber covers almost every issue examined in 
the De substantia orbis and cites Averroes’ treatise in extenso multiple times. He explains 
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The difference between these two approaches is readily apparent in 
the three questions lying in the intersection of philosophy with theology and 
causing several doctrinal controversies in the 13th and 14th centuries. These 
are (1) the question of the infinite power of the prime mover and (2) the ques-
tion of efficient and final causality that comes with the prior. (3) The third 
issue I will analyze deals with the possibility of creation ex nihilo. Its con-
clusion is the consequence of the answers to the first two questions. To have 
a better insight into the character of the commentaries, I will present the 
outline of chosen aspects and excerpts from Averroes’s works that were 
significant for Latin philosophers commenting on the De substantia orbis. 
Doctrinal Background 
One of the key concepts of Aristotelian physics is the axiom that everything 
that is in motion was previously moved by something else (omne motum 
ab alio movetur).7 For this reason, one of the most abstruse concepts in 
the medieval exegesis of Aristotle is the prime mover that is to be the ori-
gin of the eternal movement of the heavens and subcelestial world. Aver-
roes puts the concept of prime mover in the middle of a discussion on the 
nature of the heavens and the whole subcelestial world, so in his commentar-
ies and in the De substantia orbis it becomes one of the key concepts of the 
that he intends to solve the problems discussed in accordance with Averroes’ position 
because this way of proceeding provides an opportunity for better philosophical exercise 
(f. 150va): “Ne tamen propter hanc rationem quae valde longa est et tediosa aliquis recedat 
a via communi, ego intendo hic ponere duas solutiones forsan aliqualiter apparentes, 
fingens me in hoc de contraria opinione causa melioris exercitii, licet ex hoc aliqualiter 
praedictam videantur debilitare.” All of these works require further research and are men-
tioned here only to present the complexity and ambiguity of the material and problems 
under scrutiny. For another example of such ambiguity, see n. 71. For further details on 
Henry Totting of Oyta, see Lorenz, 1989, pp. 185–200; Weijers, 2001, pp. 68–73. For the 
description of the manuscript Erfurt, Biblioteca Amploniana 2° 297, see Schum, 1887, 
pp. 201–203, 815. For further details on John Aurifaber of Halberstadt, see: Lorenz, 1989, 
pp. 224–239; Pinborg, 1985, pp. 137–192; Weijers, 2001, pp. 119–120. For problems 
with establishing differentia specifica of Averroism, see Kuksewicz, 1997, pp. 93–96. 
For the “historiographical myth” of Latin Averroism, see: Fioravanti, 1966; Imbach, 
1991; Libera, 1991, pp. 98–142; Marenbon, 2012; Piaia, 1985.
7 For this principle, see Weisheipl, 1965.
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philosophy of nature.8 For 14th century commentators, special attention was 
paid to the link between three causes only roughly sketched by Aristotle, 
i.e., (1) the last sphere of fixed stars—subiectum motus, or primum mobile—
with its mover, the intelligence moving the spheres; (2) the lower celestial 
spheres with their movers; (3) the unmoved and unchanging prime mover, 
the first principle of the universe. All of these concepts were meticulously 
investigated in Averroes’s long commentaries known in the Latin world 
from the early 13th century onwards. They were also briefly outlined in 
the De substantia orbis, where Averroes explains—often in various and 
slightly differing terms—the interaction between the prime mover and the 
celestial bodies. 
According to the long commentary on the Physics VIII, the prime 
mover is not inhered in the matter but is subsistent, incorporeal, unmoved 
and does not have magnitude, so its action is infinite.9 The reason why it 
needs to be incorporeal is the following: If infinite power were applied to the 
body, it would follow that this body moved in no time (in instanti). On the 
other hand, if infinity were applied not to the body, it would be called neither 
infinite nor finite because these terms refer only to body and magnitude. 
Thus, no concept of finitude or infinity can be applied to it, since they refer 
only to bodies.10 
8 For further details, see: Jung-Palczewska, 1997, pp. 47–49; Maier, 1955, pp. 227–
234.
9 Averroes, Commentum in Phys., lib. VIII, com. 78 (ed. Iuntina IV, f. 423vaI): “Motor 
primus non est in materia, sed subsistens per se.”; Averroes, Commentum in Phys., 
lib. VIII, com. 86 (ed. Iuntina IV, f. 433vbK): “Concludit quod primus motor de quo 
declaratum est ipsum non moveri non habet corpus, id est non habet formam in materia 
[...] non potest habere magnitudinem, id est cum iam ostendimus quod omnis corporis 
finiti actio est finita et similiter omnis virtus in corporeet quod primi motoris actio est 
infinit, manifestum est quod primus motor non habet magnitudinem omnino.”
10 Averroes, Commentum in Phys., lib. VIII, com. 79 (ed. Iuntina IV, f. 427rbE–F): 
“Finitum et infinitum solum de corporibus dici possunt et sic sola actio istorum dicetur 
infinita. [...] Si vero illam posueris in corpore, tunc non dicetur finitum aut infinitum 
eo quod non est in corpore. [...] Unde, si dixerimus potentias esse in corporibus, tunc 
actio earum erit proportionalis, scilicet quod proportio potentiae motivae ad potentiam 
motivam est sicut proportio velocitatis motus ad velocitatem. Existentibus autem non 
in corpore non est proportio, cum proportio solius est magnitudinis ad magnitudinem.”
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In his long commentary on the Metaphysics,11 Averroes takes up the 
question of the prime mover’s nature, distinguishing three kinds of power: 
power in substance (in substantia), in alteration (in alteratione) and in 
the local movement (in ubi). The notion of infinite and finite might only 
be applied to the third one since the power Averroes is referring to is the 
force of movement.12 This movement, he explains in the long commentary 
on the Metaphysics XII, has its source in two different movers: the prime 
mover, which is infinite and moves with finite motion, and the second mover, 
also identified with the intelligence of the first sphere, i.e., the sphere of the 
fixed stars. The prime mover does not move as an efficient cause, but as 
a finite cause, so, as such, it does not perform any action. Yet, the intel-
ligence of the first heaven moves the lower spheres as an efficient cause in 
consequence of thinking and desiring the first principle, which is the most 
desirable principle of the universe every other sphere is heading towards.13 
According to the long commentary on the De caelo II, due to prox-
imity of the first principle, the intelligence of the first sphere—which is 
11 For further details on Averroes’s concept of the prime mover and cosmology in his 
commentary on the Metaphysics, see Genequand, 1986, pp. 33–48, 54–55.
12 Averroes, Commentum in Metaphys., lib. XII, com. 41 (ed. Iuntina VIII, f. 324raC–
bD): “Est enim potentia in substantia, in alteratione et in ubi. [...] Corpus caeleste non 
habet potentiam nisi tantum in ubi. Si igitur potentia qua movetur hoc motu aeterno 
fuerit in eo, aut est finita aut infinita. [...] Sed non consequitur ex hoc quod omne corpus 
habeat omnem potentiam quia corpus caeleste non habet potentiam nisi tantum in ubi.”
13 Averroes, Commentum in Metaphys., lib. XII, com. 41 (ed. Iuntina VIII, f. 324rbE–F): 
“Iste motus componitur ut declaratum est ex duobus motoribus quorum unum est finitae 
motionis et est anima existens in eo; et alter est infinitae motionis, et est potentia, quare 
non est in materia. Secundum igitur quod movetur a potentia finita movetur in tempore, 
cum dicere finitatem est habere proportionem terminatam ad motam rem et in sua subs-
tantia est aeterna.”; Averroes, Commentum in Metaphys., lib. XII, com. 36 (ed. Iuntina 
VIII, f. 319raC–bD): “[S]i motor corporum caelestium est magis bonus omnibus, necesse 
est, ut sit desideratus magis bonis omnibus. Et intendebat <Aristoteles>, cum dicit et non 
existimatur, quia desideramus distinguere inter desiderium intellectus et sensus. In quo 
enim appetitus sensuum non dominatur super intellectum, reputatur desideratum esse 
bonum, quia est desiderabile. Et omnia ista dicit ad declarandum quod corpora caelestia, 
cum habent appetitum propter intellectum. Intellectus autem maius bonum ipso appetit, 
contingit necessario quod corpora caelestia appetunt in hoc motu aliquid magis bonum 
ipsis. Et cum illa sunt nobilissima corpora sensibilium et meliora, necesse est, ut illud 
bonum quod appetunt sit nobilissimum entium et maxime quod appetit totum caelum 
in motu diurno.” 
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also the second mover—is moved directly by the unmoved prime mover 
as an end of the movement and the intelligible object of desire. Thus, the 
second mover moves the heavens with a constant finite force, proportional 
to the force the third and every subsequent sphere can absorb in their 
eternal movement.14 Also, the proximity to the first mover determines the 
number of actions the spheres perform, i.e., the first sphere and its mover 
performs only one action to attain the goodness of the first principle, the 
next sphere needs two actions, and so every subsequent mover needs more 
action due to the distance from the goodness they are trying to achieve.15 
In the De substantia orbis16 Averroes addresses the issue of the correct 
understanding of the term “infinity” once applied to the prime mover’s power, 
tackling it in a slightly different way. Among the distinctions concerning the 
14 Averroes, Commentum in De caelo, lib. II, com. 38 (ed. Carmody, 2003, pp. 342–342, 
ll. 68–70, 78–82, 90–94, 98–102): “Et ob hoc quidem necesse est ut omnis motus natu-
ralis et voluntarius habeat velocitatem terminatam, quia omnis motus habet motorem 
terminatum. [...] Et si potentiae eorum essent infinitae in vigore movendi, non esset 
proportio inter motorem et rem motam; et si hoc esset, non esset differentia inter eos, 
neque esset illic multitudo omnino, verbi gratia quia motor orbis Saturni et motor totius 
moveret tempore infinito. [...] Si ceteri orbes habuissent ex multitudine stellarum quod 
habet orbis stellatus, tunc motor eorum non posset movere eos in velocitate quam modo 
habent. [...] Potentiae moventium sunt terminatae proportionis ad corpora mota. [...] Causa 
in terminatione proportionum quae sunt inter potentias motorum et rerum motarum ab 
eis est diversitas formarum. [...] Haec infinitas sit communis formis quae sunt in materia 
et formis quae non sunt in materia.”
15 Averroes, Commentum in De caelo, lib. II, com. 62 (ed. Carmody, 2003, p. 393, 
ll. 34–40): “[P]rimum caelum, quod movetur motu diurno quod est nobilius eorum que 
sunt illius generis, necesse est ut acquirat nobilitatem que est in illo genere una actione, 
et quod illud quod est valde remotum ab eo aut acquiret ipsam magna operatione aut 
omnino non acquiret eam magna operatione neque parva, sed acquiret nobilitatem de qua 
habet naturam ut acquirat, et ea que sunt media acquirent operatione media.” Averroes, 
Commentum in De caelo, lib. II, com. 63 (ed. Carmody, 2003, pp. 395–396, ll. 46–54): 
“[I]am enim declaravimus illic quod additio potentiae motoris super potentiam moti 
non est infinita nisi in tempore et in aeternitate motionis, non in velocitate neque in 
multitudine motuum neque in magnitudine corporum, quoniam si esset in magnitudine 
corporum et motuum multitudine et velocitate motuum, esset possibile invenire motum 
non in tempore et corpus motum infinitum quod est impossibile; et quod est possibile 
ex istis non est nisi motionem esse infinitam, secundum quod dicitur quod potentiae 
istorum motorum sunt infinitae.”
16 For doctrinal importance of the treatise and its impact on the Latin world, see 
Lerner, 1996, pp. 139–164.
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nature of the prime mover and its attributes, the twofold notion of infinity 
plays a key role, namely infinity as a force of infinite action and passion 
in time, but finite in itself that is finite in velocity and force; and infinity 
as a force of infinite action and passion in itself.17 In the former meaning, 
infinity is understood as the ability to cause movement of infinite duration 
but of a finite force. In the latter, it is the ability to cause movement which 
is infinite in its velocity and force. Averroes rejects the assumption that an 
infinite action of the like might be performed among corporeal bodies, so he 
states that the prime mover is infinite in duration—it causes the movement 
to last eternally—yet it is finite in its power since he cannot interact with 
infinite force on something which is of finite nature.18 In the De substantia 
orbis Averroes also develops a concept present later in his long commentar-
ies, i.e., that celestial spheres with their intelligences have appetitive virtues 
that are the very reason they are leaning towards something desirable. And 
since the most desirable object is the prime mover, they are leaning towards 
it as to the final cause, thus continuing and preserving the movement of the 
inferior parts of the universe.19 As such, the celestial bodies as separate 
substances are also both final and efficient causes. As the former, they are 
17 Averroes, De substantia orbis III (ed. Iuntina IX, f. 9rbF–vaG): “Et ad hoc dicamus 
breviter quod infinitum dicitur duobus modis quorum unus est virtus infinitae actionis et 
passionis in tempore et est finita in se, scilicet in velocitate et vigore; secundus est virtus 
infinitae actionis aut passionis in se.”
18 Averroes, De substantia orbis III (ed. Iuntina IX, f. 9vaH–I): “Infinitum igitur esse in 
vigore cuius causa est corpus secundum quod est corpus impossibile est in corporibus sive 
caelestibus sive aliis. Infinitum vero in tempore esse est necesse in corporibus caelestibus 
ex diversitate motoris et moti in eis a corporibus generabilibus et corruptibilibus. Et est 
impossibile in corporibus generabilibus et corruptibilibus, quia virtutes eorum motivae 
sunt motivae materiales et corpora sua quae moventur ab eis componuntur ex materia 
et forma.”
19 Averroes, De substantia orbis IV (ed. Iuntina IX, f. 10rbF): “Et cum considera-
vit de istis virtutibus, declaratum fuit ei ipsam esse virtutem appetitivam de virtutibus 
animae tantum. Et cum consideravit in virtutibus appetitivis caelestibus vidit eas moveri ad 
appetibile nobilius ipsis. Et cum consideravit de virtutibus appetitivis caelestibus, invenit 
eas esse finitarum potentiarum. Et cum consideravit in continuatione motus eorum, fuit 
declaratum quod causa continuationis non est ista qua movetur, sed illud quod largitur 
eis continuationem est aliud appetibile.”
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the ends for lower spheres with their intelligences, and as the latter, they are 
direct causes of movement for subsequent lower spheres.20 
In summary, according to Averroes’s view, the Aristotelian prime 
mover—identified by Arabic, Jewish and Christian philosophers as the 
God of religion—moves as a final cause, the most desirable principle, 
unmoved and unchanging, desired as an end by the whole of heaven. Yet 
these concepts may, to some extent, cause confusion, and some questions 
are still to be raised: what does it mean that the prime mover is neither 
finite nor infinite but moves with finite power? Is the prime mover merely 
a final cause or also, at least to some extent, an efficient cause? Since it is 
only a final cause, it does not actively interact with the universe he created. 
Furthermore, if it does not have infinite force or efficient causality, then 
God’s ability to freely create various effects—including the creation of the 
world—can be questioned and challenged.
fernand of Spain on the De substantia orbis
Fernand of Spain (Fernandus Hispanus) was a university master at the 
Faculty of Arts in Paris in the last two decades of the 13th and, probably, 
the first decade of the 14th centuries. He is known as the author of vast 
commentaries on the Metaphysics or the Economics, and he also com-
posed a treatise, De specie intelligibili. Moreover, Fernand authored the 
commentary on the De substantia orbis that was traditionally ascribed to 
John of Jandun. In his works, he adopted some ideas characteristic of the 
Averroistic current of the late 13th and early 14th centuries, of which 
his commentary on the De substantia orbis appears to be a good exam-
ple.21 In Fernand’s commentary, there are several quaestiones that undertake 
20 Averroes, De substantia orbis I (ed. Iuntina IX, f. 5vaG): “Nihil est in corporibus 
caelestibus quo forma qua est motus differat ab ea ad quam est motus, immo sunt eadem 
forma et non differunt nisi dispositione.”
21 I undertake a detailed discussion on this attribution in my PhD thesis, so I omit 
further explanations on this subject. On general and rather scarce details about Fer-
nand’s biography, see: Weijers, 1996, pp. 87–89; Zimmermann, 1968; Zimmermann, 
1994, pp. 214–216. Although there is no single article devoted to difficult and dubious 
attribution of this commentary to John of Jandun, there are, however, several articles 
where the problem was mentioned, see: Etzkorn, 1981, pp. 120–122; Hoffmann, 2001; 
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this issue and are accompanied by a heavily detailed expositio textus. To keep 
the article compact, I will focus solely on question X, Utrum in separatis 
a materia efficiens et finis differant vel sint idem; and question XII, Utrum 
primus motor vel primum principium sit infinitum in vigore.22
In his commentary on the De substantia orbis Fernand claims that many 
schoolmen perceive Aristotle, and the Commentator in particular, as remain-
ing in opposition to the Catholic faith.23 Many of them think that the Com-
mentator states the first principle is limited in its power because the prime 
mover sets the heavens in motion with a limited velocity.24 The fundamental 
problem underlying this misunderstanding, says Fernand, is the obscure con-
cept of the prime mover and its nature that can be found in Averroes’s long 
commentary on the Physics VIII.25 Averroes writes in various places about 
separated movers (motores separati) as causing the eternal movement (motus 
perpetuus) and having a finite power (vigor determinatus). Fernand—after 
Zimmermann, 1994, pp. 215–216; Zimmermann, 1995. On the doctrinal content of the 
commentary as attributed to John of Jandun, see: Lamy, 2012a; Maurer, 1990, pp. 283–
285. On the debate concerning Fernand’s Averroism, see: Galle, Guldentops, 2004, 
pp. 51–55; Kuksewicz, 1977, pp. 187–192; Van Steenberghen, 1974, pp. 548–550; 
Zimmermann, 1968.
22 In Fernand’s commentary, there is also question XIII, Utrum intelligentiae depen-
deant a primo principio in ratione causae efficientis vel solum finis (Vatican, Biblioteca 
Apostolica, Vat. lat. 845, ff. 299va–300rb) which takes up the discussed problems in 
a similar manner. For the purposes of this short presentation though these two questions 
provide enough material for analysis.
23 Fernandus Hispanus, Commentum in De substantia orbis, q. XII, Utrum primus 
motor vel primum principium sit infinitum in vigore (Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica, 
Vat. lat. 845, f. 294va): “De ista quaestione credunt multi magni viri in philosophia 
opinionem Philosophi et praecipue Commentatoris veritati fidei catholicae adversari.” 
24 Fernandus Hispanus, Commentum in De substantia orbis, q. XII, Utrum primus 
motor vel primum principium sit infinitum in vigore (Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica, 
Vat. lat. 845, f. 294vb): “Et sic ex omnibus istis videtur esse de intentione Commentatoris, 
quod primum principium est finitum in vigore, quia ipsum est primus motor qui movet 
primum mobile in velocitate terminata.”
25 Fernandus Hispanus, Commentum in De substantia orbis, q. XII, Utrum primus 
motor vel primum principium sit infinitum in vigore (Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica, 
Vat. lat. 845, f. 294vb): “Sed opinio Commentatoris et Philosophi per consequens latet 
sic opinantes, ut statim apparebit. Causa autem huius latentiae, ut existimo, est duplex. 
Una est defectus termini demonstrationum 8 Physicorum quae communiter defici-
unt de commento Averrois in quarum ultima istam quaestionem movet et determinat in 
propria forma. Et quia communiter non habetur, ideo communiter eius intentio ignoratur.”
192 Łukasz tomanek
reproaching some unnamed authors for the frequent error of transferring 
Averroes’s investigations of the separated movers to the investigations of the 
prime mover—stresses that Averroes’s solution is the following: the prime 
mover (motor separatus), is a power utterly separated that remains incorpo-
real (potentia omnino separata), while the other movers, however, are only 
partially separated and partially connected with matter (quandoque separati, 
also called motores appropriati).26 Furthermore, it is unreasonable to accept 
infinite power in bodies (in corpore), for, if it were in bodies, the movement 
would occur in no time (in instanti), which is impossible since the movement 
is being caused within time. Also, the occurrence of infinite action in the body 
would result in contradiction, i.e., the existence of infinite power inhered 
in magnitude. Yet, the occurrence of infinite power not in the body (non in 
corpore) is also impossible, for the finite and infinite can occur only in rela-
tion to bodies and magnitude. Therefore, to avoid contradiction, the prime 
mover itself cannot be considered—properly speaking—by means of the 
finite-infinite categories, for it remains beyond the matter and moves with 
a finite force. It also cannot influence with infinite power the celestial body, 
i.e., the heavens and its movers, partially connected with bodies.27 
26 Fernandus Hispanus, Commentum in De substantia orbis, q. XII, Utrum primus 
motor vel primum principium sit infinitum in vigore (Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica, 
Vat. lat. 845, f. 294vb): “Altera est, quia—cum Aristoteles in 8 Physicorum probat motum 
perpetuum causari a motore separato qui non est corpus nec virtus in corpore—intelligit 
istum motorem esse primum principium, et ideo cum in 2 Caeli et mundi Commentator 
dicat quod omnes motores separati sunt vigoris determinati, creditur hoc extendi ad pri-
mum motorem omnino separatum, non advertens quod in eodem 8 et in 2 Caeli et mundi 
et in 12 Metaphysicae vocat primum principium potentiam omnino separatam quae non 
est in corpore, motores vero appropriatos vocat quandoque separatos, quandoque vero 
potentias in corporibus diversis respectibus. [...] Vocat ergo potentiam infinitam quae non 
est in materia primum principium et dicit ipsum non esse in materia respectu motorum 
approptiatorum, quasi innuens motores appropriatos esse in corporibus.”
27 Fernandus Hispanus, Commentum in De substantia orbis, q. XII, Utrum primus 
motor vel primum principium sit infinitum in vigore (Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica, 
Vat. lat. 845, f. 295ra): “Circa hoc movet quaestionem, scilicet quare sequitur quod, si 
potentia infinita esset in corpore, motus fierit in non tempore et non sequitur istud, si 
potentia sit non in corpore, ex quo enim potentia est infinita et movet sive illa potentia 
infinita sit in corpore sive non, videtur quod deberet esse motus in instanti. Et respondens 
dicit, quod si aliqua actio infinita sit alicuius corporis vel virtutis in corpore, sequitur 
virtutem illam esse infinitam, sed si actio fuerit alicuius virtutis non in corpore, tunc illa 
virtus secundum id quod est corporis non potest dici finita nec infinita. Cuius ratio est, 
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Given that the prime mover moves with finite force, the continuity 
and eternity of movement need to be explained. The celestial spheres, says 
Fernand after Averroes, have no potency to be corrupted, and their movement 
has continuous existence. However, the celestial body has matter, although 
in equivocal meaning compared to the matter of transient beings. Thus, the 
celestial body, although eternal in its substance, does not have continuity from 
itself, since it is virtually possible for them to move or not move eternally, 
in other words, their movement is not necessary, it has the potency to stop 
moving at some point (in caelo non est possibilitas nisi ut quiescat). The rea-
son that it does not cease to move must be then external to it, so it must be 
caused by a mover that does not have potentiality at all—neither essentially, 
nor accidentally—and this mover is the first principle of the world, the prime 
mover having infinite power in duration.28 
In order to clarify the relation between God and the created world, i.e., 
to specify the causal relation between them, Fernand of Spain introduces the 
concept of two movers: the first and simple mover, i.e., God, being utterly 
separated from matter (motor separatus) that acts indirectly (mediatum) as 
a final cause (finis) through the second mover (motor appropriatus), that is 
quia finitum et infinitum solum de corporibus et magnitutidinibus dici possunt, ut apparet 
1 Physicorum, quia ‘finitum et infinitum quantitati congruunt’.”
28 Fernandus Hispanus, Commentum in De substantia orbis, q. XII, Utrum primus 
motor vel primum principium sit infinitum in vigore (Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica, 
Vat. lat. 845, f. 295va): “Intelligendum tamen quod primum principium dicitur infinitum 
in duratione, licet non dicatur infinitum in vigore. Cuius ratio est, quia, sicut dicit Com-
mentator in loco praeallegato 12 Metaphysicae, “in corpore caelesti non est potentia, ut 
corrumpatur, quia non habet contrarium, et ideo est permanens per suam substantiam, 
motus autem eius non est permanens per suam essentiam, cum habeat contrarium, scili-
cet ipsam quietem”, et ideo potest corrumpi. Ad hoc igitur quod motus caeli permaneat 
aeternaliter “oportet ponere aliquam potentiam permanentem aeternaliter sine possibi-
litate corruptionis et permutationis, quia in caelo non est possibilitas nisi ut quiescat. 
Et quia probatum est esse impossibile caelum quiescere [...], igitur necesse est, ut ista 
permanentia motus sit propter motorem in quo nulla est potentia omnino nec essentia-
liter nec accidentaliter et tale non est in materia omnino”. Et sic permanentia motus et 
continuitas est a primo principio et ideo subdit Commentator circa finem eiusdem partis 
quod “potentiae moventes corpora caelestia, scilicet motores appropriati, possibile est, ut 
semper moveant et ut semper non moveant. Possunt enim non semper movere, si posueri-
mus illud ad quod moventur, scilicet primum motorem esse receptibilem transmutationis 
cuiuscumque modi. Possunt autem semper movere, quando illud ad quod movent fuerit 
non transmutabile aliquo modo transmutationis.” 
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intelligences, or more precisely, the intelligence of the last sphere, which 
affects the world directly (immediatum), i.e., as an efficient cause.29 The prime 
mover as motor separatus does not move the heavens, i.e., primum mobile, 
directly, but indirectly through the second mover that interacts with the 
subject of the movement, i.e., the first sphere. The movement of the heavens 
lasts eternally due to the action of God as the final cause, the first principle, 
which is immovable and unchanging. These two attributes are also the 
very reason why it does not act as an efficient cause that affects the world 
by direct action.30 Thus, all activity that occurs in the world is caused not 
directly by God, referred to above as motor separatus and object of love, 
amatum, but by the connected mover, i.e., motor coniunctus, also referred 
29 Fernandus Hispanus, Commentum in De substantia orbis, q. X, Utrum in separatis 
a materia efficiens et finis differant vel sint idem (Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica, Vat. lat. 
845, f. 289rb; 290ra): “Ad quaestionem dicatur quod in separatis duplex est movens, 
scilicet movens mediatum quod est simpliciter primum, scilicet deus ipse; et movens 
immediatum ut sunt intelligentiae. [...] Quare apparet primum movere solum in ratione 
finis, dicit etiam in eodem 12 quod “non est idem, quod motor primi mobilis intelli-
git de primo principio, cum eo quod de ipso intelligit motor Saturni”. Supra etiam in isto 
libello dicit quod formae corporum caelestium et maxime corporis ultimi, scilicet primi 
caeli, est anima appetitiva et intellectiva, et si primum caelum habeat animam, quae est 
motor appropriatus praeter ipsum primum, sequitur quod primum non movet nisi ut finis 
et ubique intentio sua sonat istud.” Fernandus Hispanus, Commentum in De substantia 
orbis, q. XII, Utrum primus motor vel primum principium sit infinitum in vigore (Vatican, 
Biblioteca Apostolica, Vat. lat. 845, f. 295va–b): “Ideo semper eodem modo intelligitur 
ab animabus caelestibus et desideratur. Et quia semper idem eodem modo intelligunt et 
desiderant, ideo semper eodem modo movent, quia igitur permanentia primi est causa 
permanentiae continuitatis motus, ideo permanentia primi et duratio habet attributionem 
ad motum qui est de genere quantorum vel consequitur quantum. Et ideo ut sic com-
petit sibi infinitas, et ideo dicitur infinitus in duratione, sed quia vigor eius non habet 
attributionem ad motum nec ad aliud, quia non movet nisi ut finis, ideo non movet per 
vigorem, et ideo sibi non competit infinitas vigoris.”
30 Fernandus Hispanus, Commentum in De substantia orbis, q. X, Utrum in sepa-
ratis a materia efficiens et finis differant vel sint idem (Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica, 
Vat. lat. 845, f. 289va): “Secundo tamen dico quod primum movens quod est movens 
mediatum movet in ratione finis tantum et non in ratione efficientis. Et videtur de inten-
tione Philosophi et Commentatoris expresse, quia ut Philosophus dicit 2 Caeli et mundi: 
Quod enim est nobile et perfectum simpliciter, non indiget actione extrinseca in acquisi-
tione nobilitatis, quia nec indiget assimilari alicui ex quo simpliciter est primum et a se 
est omnis nobilitas et omnis perfectio; sed primum principium est huiusmodi; quare ipse 
non movet effective.”
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to as amans, which affects the world directly and with a single action,31 
a consequence of desiring the first principle.32 The division into two movers 
enables us to grasp how the prime mover, transcending finite-infinite catego-
ries, moves the world with finite force: it moves as an end (finis) to which 
all the universe leans towards, thus setting the spheres and the whole world 
into movement with constant force. Fernand illustrates this dependence with 
an example borrowed from Averroes’s long commentary on the Metaphysics 
XII: a healthy person does not go for a walk to gain health but to maintain 
it. In this sense, the first intelligence does not desire to be like the prime 
mover, but to maintain the likeness it already has.33 Thus the connection 
between the three main causes of the world discussed in the De substantia 
orbis and later in long commentaries34 appears to be as follows: (1) the prime 
mover, as a final cause infinite in duration, is the object of desire of (2) the 
connected mover that—as a consequence of its desire and intellection of the 
first principle—sets with constant and finite power (3) the entire world, i.e., 
the heavens with the lower spheres, in eternal motion.
31 On the movement and actions of the spheres, see Averroes’ position on p. 187 and 
Maino’s application of this solution on pp. 197–199.
32 Fernandus Hispanus, Commentum in De substantia orbis, q. X, Utrum in separatis 
a materia efficiens et finis differant vel sint idem (Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica, Vat. lat. 
845, f. 289vb): “Dicit enim quod primum movet in ratione amati et desiderati, et post-
quam ostendit ibi Philosophus conditiones primi moventis extrinseci, inquirit quid est 
principium huius motus in ipso motore et dicit quod hoc est intelligentia. Quare apparet 
quod ipse vult praeter primum sit alius motor coniunctus qui movet effective. Et Com-
mentator ibidem dicit quod “primum caelum movetur ab unico motore, scilicet primo, 
secundum desiderium, ut assimiletur ei secundum suum posse, sicut amans movetur, ut 
assimiletur suo amato, alii vero orbes moventur secundum desiderium ad motum primi”, 
ut dicit. Ex quo apparet quod primum non movet nisi ut finis.”
33 Fernandus Hispanus, Commentum in De substantia orbis, q. X, Utrum in separatis 
a materia efficiens et finis differant vel sint idem (Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica, Vat. 
lat. 845, f. 290rb): “Ad primam dicatur quod intelligentiae moventur per illud quod 
intelligunt de primo, non ut acquirant similitudinem eius quam non habent, sed ut simi-
litudinem eius quam habent conservent per motum et causalitatem, ut sanus deambulat 
non ut sanitatem acquirat, sed ut sanitatem quam habet conservet, ut Commentator dicit 
12 Metaphysicae, modo quia intelligentiae non intelligunt per species acquisitas ex 
sensibus, sed per essentias suas et ipsum primum est intellectus abstractus, sicut ipse 
licet multo perfectior.”
34 See above pp. 185–190.
196 Łukasz tomanek
Fernand concludes that what he presents is the Philosopher’s and 
the Commentator’s intention, and it should be clear to anyone who dili-
gently deliberates on this matter. He also states that Averroes’s solution 
does contradict the Catholic faith even though, according to theologians, 
God has infinite power, not being limited by any relation whatsoever.35 
However, regardless of how convincing the Spanish commentator wants 
to be when he justifies the lack of contradiction between faith and reason 
in this matter, Fernand’s constant negation of divine efficient causality 
leads to further doctrinal consequences that are fairly unorthodox in their 
meaning. The first and foremost is denying the possibility of the crea-
tion of the world ex nihilo. As Fernand says, the prime mover does not cre-
ate ex infinita distantia, i.e., ex nihilo—this solution is excluded alongside 
the choice of philosophical argument.36 Furthermore, discarding creatio 
ex nihilo is the consequence of the recognition of the prime mover not as 
causa efficiens, but as causa finalis only. As a result of these assumptions, 
it follows that the prime mover as a causa finalis is not an agent cause, 
changing, moving and affecting the world directly. It is rather the distant 
end that the whole world is heading for. As such the prime mover tends to 
preserve the existence of beings and make them more perfect, simultaneously 
maintaining the continuity and eternity of movement. It is impossible for the 
prime mover as a final cause to cause the transition from non-esse to esse. 
35 Fernandus Hispanus, Commentum in De substantia orbis, q. XII, Utrum primus 
motor vel primum principium sit infinitum in vigore (Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica, 
Vat. lat. 845, f. 296vb): “Hoc videtur esse intentio Philosophi et expresse Commenta-
toris circa istam quaestionem, nec est repugnantia in verbis Commentatoris diligenter 
consideranti, licet hoc aliqui credant. Et ista opinio non discordat realiter a veritate fidei, 
licet verba theologorum dicunt primum principium esse infinitum in vigore, quia intel-
ligunt ipsum non limitatum nec proportionatum alicui, sed extra proportionem alicuius 
alterius virtutis.”
36 Fernandus Hispanus, Commentum in De substantia orbis, q. X, Utrum in sepa-
ratis a materia efficiens et finis differant vel sint idem (Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica, 
Vat. lat. 845, f. 296ra): “Ad aliam, cum dicitur: ‘Illud quod causat ex infinita distantia’ etc. 
Concedatur maior et si minor esset concessa, concluderet ratio necessario, sed philosophi 
negarent minorem et probationem eius, quia, sicut apparet ex 1 Physicorum, ‘communis 
conceptio omnium philosophorum fuit quod ex nihilo nihil fit’.”
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maino de’ maineri on the De substantia orbis
The immediate relation between the question of the infinity of the world 
and the power of God can be found in the commentary on the De substantia 
orbis composed ca. 1315 by Maino de’ Maineri (Magninus de Maineriis). 
He was active at the Parisian Faculty of Arts in the second decade of the 14th 
century. At the time, he also commented upon the De anima. He is recog-
nized as socius of John of Jandun—he took part in several disputes with him 
and other Parisian masters.37 His commentary discusses the problem of the 
infinite power of God in the question that focuses on the creation of the 
world from nothing, i.e., question VI, Utrum ex nihilo possit aliquid fieri.38
At the beginning of divisio textus Maino starts where Fernand’s investi-
gations end. Maino presents two popular views on creation: first, an opinion, 
attributed to Avicenna, discussing the possibility of the world’s creation ex 
aeterno; and second, a religious view that the world was created de novo, 
i.e., ex nihilo.39 Maino devotes much attention to disproving the first view, 
yet he comments on the second with only one sentence and claims it not 
to be questioned, for God’s power is no doubt able to create anything 
out of nothing.40 Then, he declares he will discuss the question according 
37 For further details on his life, work and activity in Paris, see: Ermatinger, 1959; 
Ermatinger, 1976; Fioravanti, 2016; Fioravanti, 2017; Kuksewicz, 1999; Kuksewicz, 
2006; Weijers, 2005.
38 The commentary has been preserved in a single manuscript: Firenze, Biblioteca 
Nazionale, Conv. Soppr. J III 6, ff. 89ra–108va. For further details on the manuscript, see: 
Kristeller, 1977, pp. 162–163; Punta, Luna, 1989, pp. 122–132. On the infinity of God’s 
power, see also (omitted here) a short discussion that Maino included in his Quaestiones 
in De anima III, q. 14, Utrum noster intellectus coniunctus magnitudini intelligat sep-
arata a materia (Bologna, Biblioteca Universitaria, 1625, f. 166rb). For further details 
on Maino’s opinions, see Kuksewicz, 2006, pp. 352–353. The critical edition of this 
commentary has been prepared by Iacopo Costa and Jean-Baptiste Brenet. For the 
manuscript and its content, see: Xiberta, 1924, pp. 162–166; Xiberta, 1932, pp. 48–49.
39 Magninus de Maineriis, Quaestiones in De substantia orbis, q. VI, Utrum ex nihilo 
possit aliquid fieri (Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale, Conv. Soppr. J III 6, f. 96va): “Quidam 
autem philosophorum dixerunt hinc fuisse ab aeterno, ut imponitur Avicennae, et quidam 
legis nostrae ponunt hoc fuisse possibile. Alii dicunt quod illa creatio fuit de novo et 
non ab aeterno.”
40 Magninus de Maineriis, Quaestiones in De substantia orbis, q. VI, Utrum ex nihilo 
possit aliquid fieri (Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale, Conv. Soppr. J III 6, f. 96va): “Sed 
illi qui ponunt creationem fuisse ab aeterno sine posse fuisse habent difficile contra se, 
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to a third view, that is Aristotle’s and the Commentator’s.41 During the very 
long and complex discussion concerning the different aspects of creation 
and the substantial composition of form and matter, Maino argues for the 
possibility of creation only from a preexisting subiectum, i.e., matter.42 
This decision is based on the same grounds on which Maino subsequently 
argues in the same question, that the prime principle has no infinite power 
because it is not possible to gain knowledge of God’s power based solely on 
empirical data, i.e., the observation of local movement.43 This claim marks 
Maino’s acceptance of the boundaries within which our natural faculties 
are restrained when investigating realms that are beyond human percep-
tion. Having acknowledged these cognitive limitations, Maino proceeds to 
reassess divine causality and God’s power—problems strictly connected 
quoniam hic videtur implicare contradictionem.” Magninus de Maineriis, Quaestiones 
in De substantia orbis, q. VI, Utrum ex nihilo possit aliquid fieri (Firenze, Biblioteca 
Nazionale, Conv. Soppr. J III 6, f. 97ra): “Opinionem legis nostrae quae ponit quod ex 
nihilo fiat aliquid modo supradicto tam in substantiis quam in accidentibus non intendo 
improbare, quoniam virtus divina hoc potest indubitanter.” Maino discusses creatio ex 
aeterno on ff. 96va–97ra.
41 Magninus de Maineriis, Quaestiones in De substantia orbis, q. VI, Utrum ex nihilo 
possit aliquid fieri (Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale, Conv. Soppr. J III 6, f. 97ra): “Sed 
ego dicam ad quaestionem quod diceret Aristoteles et Commentator eius quod ex nihilo 
nihil potest fieri.”
42 From the long corpus of questions see for instance this excerpt: Magninus de Mai-
neriis, Quaestiones in De substantia orbis, q. VI, Utrum ex nihilo possit aliquid fieri 
(Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale, Conv. Soppr. J III 6, f. 98ra): “Dico quod ad evitandum 
creationem sufficit quod praexistat aliquid de eo quod producitur; modo quod producitur 
est compositum; et ideo sufficit quod praexistat aliquid de composito, scilicet materia. 
Sed ratio concludit quod ad minus forma creabitur, quia nihil praeexistet de forma. Ego 
possum dicere quod forma non generatur nisi per accidens ut dicunt plurimi compositum 
autem per se primo. Et ideo dicam quod ad evitandum creationem sufficit quod praeexistat 
aliquid de composito, scilicet materia.”
43 Magninus de Maineriis, Quaestiones in De substantia orbis, q. VI, Utrum ex nihilo 
possit aliquid fieri (Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale, Conv. Soppr. J III 6, f. 98ra: “Credo 
dicendum quod primum principium non est infiniti vigoris, quia Philosophus non habet 
plus ponere de primo principio quam possit per motum investigari; sed per motum non 
potest investigari primum esse infiniti vigoris, nam ad hoc quod virtus aliqua moveat 
per tempus infinitum sufficit quod sit infinita in essendo et infatigabilis in operando.”
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with the above-discussed problem of creation44—according to philosophical 
argument suitable for this line of investigation. 
A large part of Maino’s question remains in the exegetic and doctrinal 
character of Fernand’s commentary and is devoted to a discussion of divine 
causality and God’s power. When considering the first principle, which 
is primarily the separate being, a twofold concept of its infinity can be 
raised. The infinity of the first principle can be considered either as an infin-
ity of God as (1) finis motus or as (2) an agens motum. If the prime mover 
is accepted to be active mover (movens active) it has to be of finite force; 
if, however, it is considered as an end (finis), the prime mover should be 
described as not having finite or infinite power because power of move-
ment—properly speaking—is something related to separate substances as 
being active movers, which the prime mover is not.45 Nevertheless, Maino 
rejects this opinion—similarly to Fernand’s earlier objections regarding 
popular misconceptions about the Commentator—and exposes it as a wrong 
interpretation of Averroes’s intention. Maino clarifies that Averroes himself 
argued in his commentary on Physics VIII that finite and infinite might be 
considered only in reference to bodies since only bodies have extension and 
magnitude. Separate intelligences, however, are not inhered in bodies, so they 
are neither finite nor infinite. Consequently, the same applies—according 
to Maino’s exposition of Averroes—to the prime mover seen as an active 
mover, i.e., as an efficient cause, but not to the prime mover as a final cause.46 
44 On this topic and its relation with divine power and causality, see above p. 196. See 
also the critical reassessment below, pp. 203–206.
45 Magninus de Maineriis, Quaestiones in De substantia orbis, q. VI, Utrum ex nihilo 
possit aliquid fieri (Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale, Conv. Soppr. J III 6, f. 98va): “Et ideo 
aliter dicitur quod primum principium de quo loquitur principaliter quod est separatum 
potest considerari: Uno modo ut finis motus; alio modo ut agens motum. Et similiter 
intelligo de aliis: Si accipiatur ut movens active sic habet vigorem finitum et debet dici 
finiti vigoris; sed si consideratur ut finis, sic non debet dici vigoris finiti vel infiniti, nam 
vigor proprie debetur separatis ut moventia active.”
46 Magninus de Maineriis, Quaestiones in De substantia orbis, q. VI, Utrum ex nihilo 
possit aliquid fieri (Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale, Conv. Soppr. J III 6, f. 98va): “Sed 
istud est omnino extra intentionem Commentatoris, quia ipse ponit rationem ad proban-
dum propositum, quia finitum et infinitum sunt solum in corporibus, modo certum quod 
intelligentiae ut moventes sunt non sunt in corporibus, ergo ut sic non habebunt vigorem 
finitum nec infinitum. Et Commentator loquitur in 8 Physicorum secundum materiam 
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In order to elucidate the essence of separate substances, i.e., the 
movers of the spheres, Maino introduces what he proudly calls his own 
exposition, which he never heard in Paris. It reads as follows: to any finite 
power corresponds a finite time proportional to it, and it applies to every 
amount of time or magnitude; and to infinite power likewise corresponds 
infinite time and infinite magnitude. Hence, infinite power as such cannot 
correspond to finite magnitude, and the same applies to movement of infinite 
velocity. If any separate substance had performed an action of infinite power, 
it would have happened in no time (in instanti) which will clearly not be 
possible since the movement must be performed within time.47
When he analyzes the distinction between efficient and final causality 
in the prime mover, Maino refers to the difference between motor separatus 
subiectivam, modo certum est quod ibi consideratur primus motor ut movens active et 
non ut finis, et ideo ut sic loquebatur ibi de primo motore.”
47 Magninus de Maineriis, Quaestiones in De substantia orbis, q. VI, Utrum ex nihilo 
possit aliquid fieri (Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale, Conv. Soppr. J III 6, f. 98va): “Et ideo 
aliter dico cum Commentatore quod virtutes separatae non debent dici finitae nec infinitae 
in vigore eo modo, supple, quo virtutes in corpore sunt finitae vel infinitae in vigore, 
nam virtutes corporales sic dicuntur finiti vigoris quod finitati vigoris correspondet finitas 
temporis et qualis est proportio in vigoribus, eadem est in temporibus mensurantibus 
et magnitudinibus; et infinitati vigoris correspondet infinitas temporis et magnitudi-
nis. Et per illum modum vult dicere Commentator quod vigor separatorum non est finitus 
nec infinitus, quia finitati vigoris non correspondet finitas temporis nec est proportio in 
temporibus quae est in vigoribus. Non ergo possit dici vigoris finiti eo modo quo illa 
inferiora corporalia, quia tempus durationis earum est infinitum et non finitum, nec possit 
dici vigoris infiniti eo modo quo ista inferiora dicuntur vigoris infiniti, nam aliquid hic 
inferius existens habens vigorem infinitum, si esset aliquid tale tempus durationis cuius 
excederet tempus durationis cuiuslibet alterius finiti vigoris in infinitum. Sed dato quod 
poneres aliquid separatum infiniti vigoris, tamen tempus durationis eius non excederet 
tempus durationis alicuius alterius finiti vigoris, quia omnia separata dato quod sunt 
vigoris finiti per vigorem finitum durant in finitum. Immo si finitum et infinitum eodem 
modo essent in separatis et corporalibus, sequeretur quod omnia separata essent vigoris 
infiniti, quia tempus correspondens eorum actionibus esset infinitum et tunc sequeretur 
quod non moverent sua mobilia indeterminata velocitate quod tamen est falsum, immo si 
stella adderetur orbi, non moveret orbem nisi cum fatigatione et poena, ut patet 2 Caeli 
ab Aristotele et Commentatore et illo modo intellexit Commentator quod non debent dici 
finiti vigoris vel infiniti secundum quod proportionantur finitati temporis et infinitati eius, 
sed quoniam sint finiti vigoris secundum quod proportionantur velocitati et tarditati motus 
non intendit Commentator. Et in illa expositione quam numquam audivi declarabatur 
anima mea et illam expositionem accepi ex dictis Commentatoris in fine 7 Physicorum.”
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and motor appropriatus. He writes that—according to some schoolmen—the 
Commentator, having already introduced his view in the Long Commen-
tary on the Metaphysics XII, makes corrections to it in the De substantia 
orbis. Nevertheless, as Maino puts it, it does not seem so—on the contrary, in 
the De substantia orbis Averroes upholds the same view, which is also to be 
found originally in Aristotle and his De caelo II.48 According to Aristotle then, 
there are entities that attain their perfection and goodness without any action, 
some attain it with one action, and others with multiple actions. The prime 
mover, however, attains its goodness and perfection performing no action 
or movement whatsoever, since it itself is the superior being that does not 
need anything but itself and, consequently, is unchangeable and immov-
able. Therefore, it is no prime mover, motor separatus, which actively and 
directly moves the heavens as an efficient cause, but is its connected mover, 
motor appropriatus, an intelligence created by the prime mover that moves 
the heavens immediately and with finite and determined velocity by the 
desire of prime mover as the universal end (finis) of consecutive spheres.49 
48 For respective views in De substantia orbis, see pp. 188–190. See also: Aristo-
tle, De caelo II.12 (292a28–292b15); Averroes, Commentum in De caelo, lib. II, com. 
63–64 per totum (ed. Carmody, 2003, pp. 395–396).
49 Magninus de Maineriis, Quaestiones in De substantia orbis, q. VI, Utrum ex nihilo 
possit aliquid fieri (Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale, Conv. Soppr. J III 6, f. 98va): 
“Ad aliam 12 Metaphysicae dicunt aliqui quod Commentator dixit ibi et ideo se corrigit 
in libello De substantia orbis, tamen non audio Commentatorem negare sic expresse. 
Ista auctoritas videtur implicare duo difficilia. Primum est quod primum <principium> 
sit infiniti vigoris nec unquam vidi auctoritatem magis expressam ad hoc probandum. 
Secundo difficile videtur in auctoritate quod primum principium non moveat primum 
caelum immediate effective. Ponit enim Commentator motorem appropriatum a quo habet 
velocitatem terminatam et illa videtur esse intentio Aristotelis et Commentatoris 2 Caeli 
capitulo de duabus difficilibus quaestionibus. Dicit enim Philosophus quod quaedam 
sunt quae attingunt suam perfectionem et suum bonum sine actione et intelligere videtur 
motorem caeli et alia unica actione et alia pluribus actionibus ut ipse dicit. Motor igitur 
primus attinget suum bonum sine actione aliqua et sic non movebit caelum effective, sed 
solum in ratione finis et illud videtur velle Aristoteles in 12 Metaphysicae, dicit enim 
semper quod primum movet ut appetibile et tale movet solum in ratione finis.” See also 
Magninus de Maineriis, Quaestiones in De substantia orbis, q. VI, Utrum ex nihilo possit 
aliquid fieri (Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale, Conv. Soppr. J III 6, f. 98vb): “Ad auctorita-
tem Commentator dicit in 12 quod caelum movere a duplici motore etc. potest dici quod 
Commentator intellexit de aliis motibus a motu primo quia alii motus habent motorem 
appropriatum praeter primum a quo habent velocitatem determinatam et a primo habent 
aeternitatem et si intelligatur de primo motu tunc dicam quod non intellexit Commentator 
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Hence, it is allowed to say that the prime mover has a finite force of move-
ment, but only as moving through the second mover, the intelligence of the 
last sphere. Yet, speaking in absolute terms, it is beyond infinity and finitude. 
Anonymous of Erfurt on the De substantia orbis
In the commentaries analyzed thus far, a unanimity of approach can be easily 
observed. The adopted solutions read as follows: (1) the prime mover has 
infinite power in duration; (2) the prime mover, motor separatus, is a final 
cause of the universe and the most desirable and the noblest being; (3) the 
mover of the first sphere, motor appropriatus, moves by desiring and think-
ing the prime mover; (4) The prime mover, a final cause, moves the universe 
eternally through the second mover, an efficient cause, with a constant and 
finite force of movement; (5) the idea of creation ex nihilo is unacceptable 
in the field of philosophy which is a result of denying God’s infinite power 
and its efficient causality. 
The third of the discussed commentaries on the De substantia orbis 
presents what appears to be an utterly different view. Its author—although 
commenting upon Averroes and often referring to his views affirmatively—
does not share the conclusions reached by the exegetic commentaries of Fer-
nand of Spain and Maino de’ Maineri, also reinterpreting some basic tenets 
to be found in Averroes’s works. This anonymous work was written ca. 
1362 in the Erfurt milieu where Averroes’s commentaries and Averroistic 
works were held in high esteem.50 The commentary consists of expositio 
ad litteram and quaestiones. The anonymous author refers in his questions 
quod habeat duos motores realiter differentes sed voluit dicere quod motor primus consi-
deratus ut efficiens motum erat motor appropriatus sed ut finis erat separatus magis et 
talis motus primus habet velocitatem determinatam a deo ut movens effective et a primo 
habet aeternitatem ut finis motus nam quia primum se intelligit in infinitum et se desiderat 
in infinitum pro tanto movet per tempus infinitum.”
50 The question-commentary has been preserved in two manuscripts differing in 
a number of questions: Kraków, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka, 735, ff. 109ra–116vb 
(breaks in the middle of q. VII) and Kraków, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka 739, 
ff. 74ra–91rb. The latter manuscript also contains exposition-commentary on 
ff. 92ra–102vb, 116ra–va, 103va–115vb. For a detailed description of these manuscripts, 
see Kowalczyk et al., 1993, pp. 229–236, 256–261. For an overview and dating of this 
commentary, see Kuksewicz, 1986, pp. 28–30. Kuksewicz was also the first to recognize 
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to the same problems as Fernand and Maino—God’s infinite power, divine 
causality, and the problem of God’s ability to create out of nothing. For the 
purposes of this presentation, I chose to analyze at length two questions from 
this commentary, i.e., question VII, Utrum primum principium, scilicet deus, 
sit infinitus intensive, and question IX, Utrum mundus exivit in esse a deo 
per modum causae efficientis. 
At the beginning of question VII, which deals with the infinite 
power of God, the Erfurt master refers to Cordovan’s authority. He claims 
that, according to Averroes, the prime mover does not have a finite but 
infinite power, for God is not connected with a magnitude and exceeds any 
power.51 This statement is followed by the conclusions he is eventually 
going to reject, i.e., (1) God is infinite in duration;52 (2) God is not infinite in 
power;53 (3) God is not infinite in intensive action (which is directly related 
this commentary as critical to Averroes. For further literature on the Erfurt milieu, see: 
Kuksewicz, 1985, pp. V–XXVIII; Kuksewicz, 2007; Lorenz, 1989, pp. 135–139.
51 Anonymus Erfordiensis, Commentum in De substantia orbis, q. VII, Utrum primum 
principium, scilicet deus, sit infinitus intensive (Kraków, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka 739, 
f. 83ra; Kraków, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka 735, f. 116ra): “In oppositum est Averroes 
in textu quia concludit motorem primum non esse potentiae finitae, sed infinitae et ibi-
dem: Nonnulla virtus potest esse separata a magnitudine; sicut est de primo principio. 
Illud probatur rationibus: Illa virtus quae in infinitum excedit virtutem finitam illa est 
infinita; primum principium in infinitum excedit quamcumquelibet virtutem finitam; 
igitur. Maior nota, quia virtus finita intensive potest alteri virtute finitae proportionari. 
Minor patet, quia deus excedit virtutem lapidis secundum duplum, tripulum et quadru-
pulum et sic sine statu.” Such a curious rendition of Averroes seems to be supported by 
two intermingled ideas borrowed from the De substantia orbis III and commentary on 
the Physics, lib. VIII, com. 86. From the former he derives the meaning of infinitum as 
solely “virtus infinitae actionis aut passionis”. From the latter, he borrows the idea of the 
prime mover as being of infinite action and beyond matter. See: Averroes, De substantia 
orbis III (ed. Iuntina IX, f. 9rbF–vaG); Averroes, Commentum in Phys., lib. VIII, com. 
86 (ed. Iuntina IV, f. 433vbK). See above pp. 185–190.
52 Anonymus Erfordiensis, Commentum in De substantia orbis, q. VII, Utrum primum 
principium, scilicet deus, sit infinitus intensive (Kraków, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka 739, 
f. 83rb; Kraków, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka 735, f. 116rb): “Primo, primum principium est 
infinitum duratione. Hoc probatur: Illud quod est aeternum et incorruptibile est infinitum 
in duratione; primum principium est huiusmodi; igitur. Maior nota quia aeternitas primi 
est sua duratio. Minor patet, quia deus ab aeterno fuit et in aeternum erit, tam secundum 
philosophos quam theologos.”
53 Anonymus Erfordiensis, Commentum in De substantia orbis, q. VII, Utrum primum 
principium, scilicet deus, sit infinitus intensive (Kraków, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka 739, 
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to the second conclusion).54 He stresses, however, that, notwithstanding 
the view represented by many philosophers, he will argue for a solution 
more probable and complete (probabilius et completius), yet contradictory 
to the three conclusions referred to above.55 For instance, he criticizes the 
view that God is infinite solely in the aspect of time but finite in action. 
He argues that the first principle’s temporal duration is its action, for in God 
all kinds of action are identical due to the simplicity of its nature. God is 
therefore infinite both in his action and duration.56 When he characterizes 
the infinity of God, the anonymous author lists four affirmative conclusions, 
the two first of which could also be found in Averroes.57 He argues that the 
f. 83rb; Kraków, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka 735, f. 116rb): “Secunda conclusio: Primum 
principium non est infinitum in vigore. Hoc probatur, quia si sic, tunc motus posset fieri 
in instanti. Consequens falsum. Falsitas patet 4 et 6 Physicorum. Consequentia probatur, 
quia si deus est infiniti vigoris, tunc potest in quemcumque effectum et per consequens 
potest producere motum subito.”
54 Anonymus Erfordiensis, Commentum in De substantia orbis, q. VII, Utrum primum 
principium, scilicet deus, sit infinitus intensive (Kraków, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka 739, 
f. 83rb; Kraków, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka 735, f. 116rb): “Tertia conclusio: Primum 
principium non est infinitum actione intensive. Illud probatur: Omne agens certae actio-
nis vel potentiae ex opposito distinguitur; sed quia caelum movetur motu finito et per 
consequens actio est finita.”
55 Anonymus Erfordiensis, Commentum in De substantia orbis, q. VII, Utrum primum 
principium, scilicet deus, sit infinitus intensive (Kraków, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka 739, 
f. 83rb; Kraków, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka 735, f. 116rb): “Quamvis ista fuerit virorum 
bene dicentium secundum hoc, verumtamen probabilius dicetur et completius et arguitur 
contra haec dicta.”
56 Anonymus Erfordiensis, Commentum in De substantia orbis, q. VII, Utrum primum 
principium, scilicet deus, sit infinitus intensive (Kraków, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka 739, 
f. 83rb; Kraków, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka 735, f. 116rb): “Videtur primo, quod conclu-
siones contradixerunt. Ad probandum: Quia praemittit eo quod duratio primi principii 
sit sua actio: Hoc patet, quia omnia primo identificantur. Secundo praemittit eo quod 
duratio primo principii sit sua actio, a principio non distinguantur. Ex hoc arguitur: Haec 
duratio primi principii est infinita; haec duratio prima est sua actio; igitur sua actio erit 
infinita et sequitur conclusio praeintenta.”
57 Anonymus Erfordiensis, Commentum in De substantia orbis, q. VII, Utrum primum 
principium, scilicet deus, sit infinitus intensive (Kraków, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka 739, 
f. 83va; Kraków, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka 735, f. 116va): “His visis prima conclusio: 
Primum principium non est infinitum infinitate mobilis. [...] Secunda conclusio quod 
principium primum non est infinitum infinitate quantitatis. [...] Tertia conclusio: Primum 
principium infinitum est in perfectione. [...] Est quarta conclusio: Primum principium 
non est infinitum perfectione dependentis.”
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concept of finite–infinite when speaking of infinitas mobilis and inifinitas 
quantitatis refers to what is divisible, has parts and inheres in the matter. 
God, however, is simple and remains beyond the matter. This explana-
tion refers to Averroes’s argument from commentary on the Physics VIII, 
referred to above several times.58 In the third conclusion, the Erfurt master 
claims God to be infinite, for it surpasses all beings and thus has infinite 
perfection.59 In the fourth, he argues that God is the only being that is utterly 
independent and self-reliant.60 The third and fourth conclusions go beyond the 
spectrum of Averroes’s investigations and are not to be found in his works. 
The consequences of these assumptions are particularly apparent in 
question IX, where the anonymous author deliberates on the problem of God’s 
power to create as causa efficiens. He argues that God has to be both the 
efficient and final cause which he derives from the De substantia orbis, 
interpreting Averroes’ position on separate substances as final and efficient 
causes as referring to the prime mover itself.61 Such a rendition justifies the 
anonymous commentator’s claims that God could and can create a human 
being, a fly, or the whole world without any effort whatsoever.62 Afterwards, 
58 See above pp. 186, 191–192, 199.
59 Anonymus Erfordiensis, Commentum in De substantia orbis, q. VII, Utrum primum 
principium, scilicet deus, sit infinitus intensive (Kraków, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka 
739, f. 84ra): “Tertia conclusio: Primum principium infinitum est in perfectione. Illa 
probatur: Illud quod excedit quamlibet perfectionem in infinitum entis hoc est infinitum 
in perfectione; primum principium est huiusmodi.”
60 Anonymus Erfordiensis, Commentum in De substantia orbis, q. VII, Utrum primum 
principium, scilicet deus, sit infinitus intensive (Kraków, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka 
739, f. 84va): “Est quarta conclusio: Primum principium non est infinitum perfectione 
dependentis. Illa probatur: Omne dependens est finitae perfectionis; igitur primum non 
est dependens.”
61 Anonymus Erfordiensis, Commentum in De substantia orbis, q. IX, Utrum mundus 
exivit in esse a deo per modum causae efficientis (Kraków, Bibilioteka Uniwersytecka 
739, f. 87rb): “In oppositum est Averroes in littera dicit enim nihil est efficiens et finis 
in separatis; sed deus est finis totius mundi; igitur efficiens. Et si sic, habetur intentum. 
Hoc confirmatur ab hoc quidem ente, id est a deo.” See Averroes’ original position on 
pp. 188–190.
62 Anonymus Erfordiensis, Commentum in De substantia orbis, q. IX, Utrum mundus 
exivit in esse a deo per modum causae efficientis (Kraków, Bibilioteka Uniwersytecka 
739, f. 87rb): “Probatur ratione: Deus potuit et potest omnem hominem producere in esse 
vel muscam et non est difficilius producere deo totum mundum seu produxisse quoniam 
talem muscam ex quo non agit cum resistentia et fatigatione.”
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the anonymous commentator establishes the terminology he will be using, 
then he presents views of Aristotle and the Commentator followed by the 
exposition of the author’s own view, critical of Averroes.63 Firstly, the Erfurt 
master explains the attributes of the eternal being using the definitions from 
Boethius’s De consolatione and he defines them as (1) interminabile and 
(2) immensurabile tempore.64 Then the author concludes that this being is 
necessarily God—he is infinitely perfect (interminabilis perfectionis), so 
he created the world ex nihilo.65 Following this assumption, he discusses 
the question of God as creating the world de novo without relying on the 
previously created matter. The world and all that is created is the immediate 
effect of creation subject to the first principle as the efficient cause (causa 
efficens). The first principle, as could be already seen in the question on the 
infinite power of God, is perfect and, consequently, independent.66 
The central part of the question is the presentation of the thirteen argu-
ments for the eternity of the world. They are listed only to be eventually 
63 Anonymus Erfordiensis, Commentum in De substantia orbis, q. IX, Utrum mundus 
exivit in esse a deo per modum causae efficientis (Kraków, Bibilioteka Uniwersytecka 739, 
f. 87rb): “In quaestione sic procedam ponendo. Primo motam magistri Conradi de Monte 
Puellarum; deinde ponendo rationes Commentatoris quae videntur in oppositum sonare 
contra positionem motam; tertio declarando modum defensandi mundum fuisse de novo 
productum.”
64 Anonymus Erfordiensis, Commentum in De substantia orbis, q. IX, Utrum mundus 
exivit in esse a deo per modum causae efficientis (Kraków, Bibilioteka Uniwersytecka 739, 
f. 87rb): “Circa primam partem est sciendum quod [spat. vac.] aeternitas mundi, videlicet 
an mundus ab aeterno fuisset, an aeternitas secundum Boethium 5 De consolatione sic 
diffinitur: ‘Est enim interminabilis vitae simul tota perfecta possesio’. Hic duo inuuntur: 
Primo quod ens aeternum debet esse inteminabile; secundo innuitur quod huiusmodi ens 
non debet mensurari tempore seu secundum prius et posterius, quare innuitur omnia quae 
sunt in tempore senescunt et thabescunt, ut dicitur 4 Physicorum tractatu de tempore.”
65 Anonymus Erfordiensis, Commentum in De substantia orbis, q. IX, Utrum mundus 
exivit in esse a deo per modum causae efficientis (Kraków, Bibilioteka Uniwersytecka 
739, f. 87rb): “Deus gloriosus produxit mundum in esse de novo. Hoc probatur, quia est 
perfectionis non interminabilis. Contradictio, ergo deus <est perfectionis interminabilis 
et> potuit mundum producere in esse.”
66 Anonymus Erfordiensis, Commentum in De substantia orbis, q. IX, Utrum mundus 
exivit in esse a deo per modum causae efficientis (Kraków, Bibilioteka Uniwersytecka 739, 
f. 88ra): “Deus voluntate sua mundum produxit de novo in esse non sub isto <subiecto> 
praeiacente. Ista probatur mundus seu caelum est effectus dependens a primo; ergo 
aliquando incepit esse. Consequentia tenet etiam totum omne dependens a deo incepisset 
esse secundum illum modum producendi.”
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disproved one after another. The first states that God is not able to create the 
world, for it would have to happen ex nihilo, which is impossible.67 The anon-
ymous author refutes this position by stating this sort of action to be possible 
when considering it not accompanied by form or matter, i.e., creation ex 
nihilo would not be possible if considered as a qualitative change (alteratio) 
that assumes the prior existence of the subject of change.68 Ultimately, he 
clarifies his view as follows: God created the world ex nihilo by his own 
will, and, as such, the world is the effect dependent on God as the perfectly 
independent first principle. He refers then to the independence of the 
power of God repeatedly and stresses it in question X likewise, where it is 
explicitly affirmed that the world is not eternal but had a beginning in time 
for, as it was explained above, it is the effect of creation dependent on the 
first principle.69 
To sum up, the conclusions drawn by the author are following: 
(1) the prime mover has infinite power not only in duration but also in action; 
(2) the prime mover is the final and efficient cause that does not need any 
mediation between itself and the created world; (3) the world was created 
ex nihilo, without any prior matter. All of these assumptions—compared 
with the two former commentaries—step against the principles commonly 
assumed in the field of natural philosophy. 
67 Anonymus Erfordiensis, Commentum in De substantia orbis, q. IX, Utrum mundus 
exivit in esse a deo per modum causae efficientis (Kraków, Bibilioteka Uniwersytecka 
739, f. 87va): “Primo sic [...] si deus produxisset mundum de novo, sequitur quod deus 
aliquid extra illum immediate perpetuisset. Consequens falsum, ergo ex quo sequitur 
falsum. Consequens probatur, quia omne quod fit ex aliquo fit. Consequentia probatur, 
quia si mundum de novo produxisset, tunc ex nihilo ex quo nihil subiit.”
68 Anonymus Erfordiensis, Commentum in De substantia orbis, q. IX, Utrum mundus 
exivit in esse a deo per modum causae efficientis (Kraków, Bibilioteka Uniwersytecka 
739, f. 88va): “Primo ad primum: Tunc agens effectum produceret ex nihilo etc. Dico 
aliquid produci ex nihilo est dupliciter: Vel ut dicit carentiam causae efficientis et finis. Sic 
est falsum. Alio modo ut dicit carentiam materiae et formae, et sic potest concedi. Et sic 
est de mundi productione. Tu dicis: Ex nihilo nihil fit. Dico quod hoc innuitur de illo quod 
sit per alterationem [...] et dispositionem iuxta illud, omne illud quod sit per alterationem 
[...] hoc semper aliquid praerequirit.”
69 Anonymus Erfordiensis, Commentum in De substantia orbis, q. X, Utrum mundus 
fuerit ab aeterno (Kraków, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka 739, f. 89rb): “Ad quaestionem 
est dupliciter conclusio: Est productus a deo et incepit esse. Probatur ista: Illud quod 
depensum est ab alio hoc incepit esse, sed mundus est huiusmodi. Praeterea, patet, quia 
depensum <est> a primo principio.”
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Conclusion
The questions raised in the De substantia orbis provided the opportunity for 
discussing the problem of God’s power and divine causality from various 
perspectives. In the first two commentaries—composed by Fernand of Spain 
and Maino de’ Maineri—we observed nothing but an endeavor to expound 
Averroes’ views with accuracy, often defending the Commentator against 
numerous popular misconceptions about his philosophy.70 The occasion for 
commenting upon the De substantia orbis is also a point of departure for 
seeking the concordance between different places in Averroes’s commentar-
ies to propose a possibly uniform view on the problems under investigation. 
Hence, due to their conceptual framework, these commentaries represent 
what we introduced at the beginning of this article as an exegetic approach 
to the De substantia orbis. In the context of this work, the exegetic approach 
represents, from the vantage point of faith reading, a heterodox and con-
troversial view of Aristotelian physics, scrutinizing problems of the prime 
mover’s nature and divine causality solely and consistently in terms of Aver-
roes’s exposition of natural philosophy, relying only on cognition provided 
by natural reason.
The anonymous commentary from Erfurt enables us to see that the 
reception of the De substantia orbis and its commentary tradition was far 
from being uniform. On the contrary, this anonymous work proves that com-
menting directly on Averroes was not always and necessarily a pretext for 
schoolmen to develop a heterodox interpretation of Aristotle as seen in the 
two Parisian commentaries. Despite it being a commentary on Averroes, and 
despite several, sometimes even affirmative references to the Commentator, 
in a context so controversial as that discussed here, the doctrinal charac-
ter of this work remains critical to the Cordovan savant, and its aspirations 
are not focused on exegesis; on the contrary, the anonymous Erfurt master 
opts for orthodox solutions to the question of the natural cognition of God’s 
attributes, especially its power, and to the question of divine causality, i.e. to 
the way God affects the created world. Thus, the anonymous commentary 
goes far beyond Averroes’ perspective in discussing his treatise and uses 
entirely different reasoning in his investigations. In the case of this work, 
the Commentator’s treaty was utilized to develop the philosophy of nature 
70 For such misconceptions, see above p. 191 and p. 199.
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consistent with the view of the Catholic faith, and it provided the anony-
mous author with the opportunity to critically reassess some of the cru-
cial tenets of Aristotelian physics. Thus, the conclusions accepted in the 
third commentary are precisely opposite to those of Fernand or Maino 
and represent what I labelled as a critical approach to the De substantia 
orbis. However, what range of diversity there actually is when referring to 
the practice of commenting upon the De substantia orbis cannot be accu-
rately evaluated here, for we are dealing with numerous, often unedited 
texts.71 The modest intention of this article, however, was to point to some 
aspects of the medieval Latin reception to Averroes that have thus far only 
been subject to superficial study.72
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Abstract
The subject of this article is the Latin reception of Averroes’s treatise De substantia 
orbis, with special regard to the commentary practice in the late Middle Ages. Numer-
ous philosophical problems were taken up in these commentaries following 
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Averroes’s lead. The most controversial among them were these concerning divine 
attributes, i.e., infinite power, efficient and final causality, and, consequently, God’s 
ability to create out of nothing. 
Three different commentaries were therefore chosen to exemplify the key 
differences between the doctrinal approaches of the commentaries on the De sub-
stantia orbis. The first two of them—composed by Fernand of Spain and Maino 
de’ Maineri—represent the exegetic approach, adopting and developing Averroes’s 
ideas; the third commentary—composed by an anonymous author in Erfurt around 
1362—represents the critical approach referring to the questions raised in the De sub-
stantia orbis in order to propose orthodox solutions being far from these adopted in 
the treaty by Averroes himself. 
The article aims at scrutinizing the problems of infinite power of God and 
divine causality as they have been taken up by Latin philosophers from the late 13th 
to the second half of the 14th century by elucidating the key differences between the 
two lines of inquiry and highlighting the variety of approaches to Averroes’s De sub-
stantia orbis.
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